Folio · Philosophy & Metaphysics

Jain Anekāntavāda: Many Truths

7 min read

Anekāntavāda (अनेकान्तवाद), "the doctrine of non-one-sidedness", is Jainism's great contribution to the philosophy of knowledge. It holds that reality has countless aspects, and that any single statement about it captures only part of the truth. It is not relativism. It is precision about the limits of precision.

Roots in Mahāvīra's Answers

The approach goes back to Mahāvīra (traditionally 599–527 BCE; many scholars place him somewhat later). In the Bhagavatī Sūtra (Viyāhapaṇṇatti), when asked whether the soul is eternal, he answers in effect: from the standpoint of substance, yes; from the standpoint of its changing states, no. Both answers are true, each from its standpoint.

The Building Blocks

The Tattvārtha Sūtra of Umāsvāti (c. 2nd–5th century CE), accepted by all Jain traditions, states that reality is known through pramāṇa (valid knowledge) and naya (standpoints) (1.6).

  • Naya (standpoint): a partial viewpoint that grasps one aspect of a thing. Jain thinkers classified seven main nayas, from the general to the most particular.
  • Syādvāda (conditional assertion): every statement should be prefaced, explicitly or implicitly, by syāt, "in some respect".

Syāt does not mean "perhaps". It means "from a certain standpoint", which is far more exact.

The Sevenfold Predication

The saptabhaṅgī, set out in works such as Samantabhadra's Āptamīmāṃsā (c. 6th century), gives seven possible statements about any property:

  1. 01In some respect, it is.
  2. 02In some respect, it is not.
  3. 03In some respect, it is and is not.
  4. 04In some respect, it is inexpressible.
  5. 05In some respect, it is and is inexpressible.
  6. 06In some respect, it is not and is inexpressible.
  7. 07In some respect, it is, is not, and is inexpressible.
  8. A pot exists as a clay pot, here, now. It does not exist as a cloth, elsewhere, or yesterday. Both are true, and to say both at once in a single word is impossible, hence "inexpressible". The scheme has interested modern logicians studying many-valued and paraconsistent logics.

    The Elephant

    The parable of the blind men and the elephant, each insisting the animal is a rope, a pillar or a fan, appears in Jain teaching and also in the Buddhist Udāna (6.4). Anekāntavāda's lesson is subtle: each man is right about what he touches and wrong only in denying the rest.

    Open-Minded Masters

    Jain thinkers turned this principle on their own debates. Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmatitarka argued that rival schools each grasp one naya. The 8th-century teacher Haribhadra wrote:

    "I have no partiality for Mahāvīra, nor hatred for Kapila and others. Whoever's words are reasonable should be accepted." (Lokatattvanirṇaya 38)

    Hemacandra (1089–1172), in the Anyayogavyavacchedikā, used anekānta to engage other schools with remarkable fairness, and sharpness.

    Critics

    Not everyone was persuaded. Śaṅkara, in his Brahma Sūtra commentary (2.2.33), objected that one cannot affirm contradictory properties of the same thing. Jain logicians replied that the properties are not contradictory, since they hold from different standpoints. The exchange is a model of serious disagreement. Jain thinkers were also careful to add that anekānta is itself held from a standpoint: in some respect, even non-one-sidedness is one-sided. A doctrine that applies its own rule to itself is rare, and quietly impressive.

    An Ethics of the Intellect

    Jainism links anekānta with ahiṃsā. Insisting that one's own view is the whole truth is a form of intellectual violence. Mahatma Gandhi, influenced by the Jain thinker Śrīmad Rājacandra, wrote that anekāntavāda taught him to see opponents' views as they saw them.

    For Every Reader

    • For children: describe your school from the view of a teacher, a pupil and a cleaner. All three are true.
    • For adults: in your next disagreement, state the other side's position so well that they agree. Then speak.
    • For organisations: a decision that has passed through several nayas is usually wiser than one that has passed through one.

    References

    • Umāsvāti, Tattvārtha Sūtra, trans. Nathmal Tatia, That Which Is (HarperCollins, 1994).
    • B. K. Matilal, The Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekānta-vāda) (L. D. Institute of Indology, 1981).
    • Haribhadra, Lokatattvanirṇaya, ed. and trans. in J. Long, Jainism: An Introduction (I. B. Tauris, 2009).
    • Śaṅkara, Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya 2.2.33, trans. Swami Gambhirananda (Advaita Ashrama, 1965).